Apparently aware of the scope and complexity of his argument, May insists on informing his reader throughout of what he has just read and what he is about to read. Such a mania for clarity detracts from the argument’s elegance and leaves the reader with the impression that there is less actual argument than a book this length deserves. And it turns out this is no mere impression. For despite the centrality of Grotius to his own response to the Just War tradition, May pays little attention either to the main voices of that tradition or to the work of Grotius himself. Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, and Suarez, all major figures in Western thinking about Just War, appear on a combined total of nine pages. In the place of a sustained analysis of Grotius’s rich and difficult work, May substitutes brief raids into those passages that best support the author’s own ethical (and unargued for) preferences, or what he calls “contingent pacifism.” To make his argument more persuasive, May would need to show more clearly than he does how Grotius’s concern for “humaneness” is compatible with his revolutionary repackaging of “natural law” as “volitional law” and its morally expansive inclusion of “permissions.” Indeed, May must explain how he can make a matter of international law (and thus subject to legal justice) what Grotius understood to be a supplement to legal commands (and thus not subject to legal strictures). May acknowledges that his reading of Grotius runs contrary to a long standing body of scholarship on the jurist, but he seems content simply to set such scholarly debates aside (relegating them to footnote 21 on pages 53–4). Those concerned with the creation of a more just and more humane international order surely deserve better. After all, where is the honor in simply ignoring powerful alternatives to one’s thesis?—Bernard Dobski, Assumption College.


Moser takes “God” to be a maximally honorary title, signifying a being worthy of worship, morally perfect in selfless love even toward enemies. Traditionally, both skeptics and theists alike have pursued evidence for a divine being without first asking what kind of evidence a specifically morally perfect being worthy of worship would make available, and without asking whether our human moral predicament makes any difference to the availability of that evidence. Typically, then, the philosopher sets the terms for the investigation, the evidence suitable for God—“akin to a spectator sport” where the inquirer’s own moral stance
is irrelevant to the evidence of divine reality. Moser argues that the evidence a perfectly loving being worthy of worship would make available would be offered on God's own morally sensitive and volitionally challenging terms.

In chapter one Moser sorts through the various meanings of naturalism and their implications for what the empirical sciences tell us about the nature of reality. Only one interpretation of the empirical sciences seriously threatens the rationality of belief in God, which Moser refers to as “core scientism.” It states, roughly, that the only real entities are those which the hypothetically completed empirical sciences say exist. But such scientism would either be self-defeating insofar as not itself included in the empirical sciences, or built-into the meaning of the empirical sciences, and, therefore, a matter of arbitrary definition. Naturalism, then, does not preclude evidence of God, especially when that God offers purposively volitional, scientifically elusive evidence for God's reality.

In the following three chapters, Moser turns to what kind of evidence God might present. While fideism conceives of faith as incompatible with any evidence for its content, natural theology offers only spectator evidence that does not involve the human will and, consequently, does not reveal an interactive, personal God who is worthy of worship, nor one who may purposively remain scientifically elusive. He proposes instead a volitional theism, and develops a type of argument from religious experience based on the transformative power that God has had in the believer's life that is likewise available to the skeptic.

Moser's personifying evidence for God involves the claim that believers see the evidence for God because they are more open and conformed to the selfless love of God than are skeptics. “The extent to which we know God . . . depends on the extent to which we are sincerely willing to cooperate with God.” Skeptics, though, aren't open to the selfless, transformative love of God, and thus they ignore that kind of evidence. The skeptic will no doubt question whether there really is such transformative love on offer, and whether he or she would be volitionally opposed to it if there were. This makes for a sort of self-fulfilling abductive argument for the believer that the skeptic will likely see as question-begging. Unfortunate as well is that Moser never considers the possibility that God's own nature, capabilities, and actions might also be elusive, or that his proposed criterion for being worthy of worship might be mistaken. I suspect the skeptic, as well as those from other religious traditions, will want more by way of justification for the theology (and Scriptures) he takes as a given throughout the book.

In the final chapter, Moser discusses the problems of religious diversity and evil. “Given this exalted moral standards for worthiness of worship, we can exclude . . . most of the familiar candidates for the preeminent title ‘God’ on the ground of moral deficiency,” which include the Augustinian and Reformed traditions, forms of doxastic exclusivism, and some portions of the Hebrew scriptures. If another religious
tradition holds to the understanding of God as perfectly loving that Moser has proposed, he is quite willing to open up the possibility of redemption in that tradition, though Christ, he argues, is ultimately the foundation of all redemption, even when not recognized as such. He closes by arguing for a form of skeptical theism in response to evil in God's world. Lacking a theodicy for the evil does not constitute a defeater for the purposively available evidence believers have.

There is much in this readable and pointed book that will interest and challenge both philosophers and theologians, and the epistemological reorientation Moser develops has the potential to significantly alter debates in current philosophy of religion, and for the better.—Patrick B. Arnold, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

POLLOCK, Benjamin. Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 352pp. Cloth, $90.00—Franz Rosenzweig (1887–1929) is one of the most fascinating and underappreciated philosophers of the 20th century. Despite being a subterranean and decisive influence on thinkers as diverse as Leo Strauss (whom he knew personally) and Emmanuel Levinas (who stated in his Totality and Infinity that Rosenzweig was “too often present in this work to be cited”), Rosenzweig has been largely passed over by scholars. Benjamin Pollock's magisterial new work, Franz Rosenzweig and the Systematic Task of Philosophy—the best in a recent revival of books on Rosenzweig (both in German and in English) over the past 20 years—may help to ensure that this great thinker will finally receive the philosophical recognition that he deserves.

Pollock's relatively straightforward argument—that Franz Rosenzweig's magnum opus, The Star of Redemption, is a philosophical system—is in fact a rather controversial claim among Rosenzweig scholars, who have typically viewed this thinker as some combination of Jewish existentialist, mystic, “dialogical” philosopher, antisystematician, and alterity-focused proto-postmodernist. Pollock correctly points out that these categories simply do not do justice to Rosenzweig's letters and published works, and he thus resolves one of the key underlying aporiae in the scholarship—that is, how can one reconcile Rosenzweig's vehement attacks on system with his numerous references to the Star as a "system of philosophy"?

Pollock answers this conundrum by conclusively showing that Rosenzweig is a radically original systematician who retrieves a deeper, more holistic sense of system, which was first formulated by Hölderlin, Hegel, and Schelling in the 1790s. This promising beginning was, on Rosenzweig's view, already corrupted and calcified in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and utterly lost after the collapse of the task