fore far from obvious that we can coherently deflate semantics and metaphysics at once, much less that doing the former provides a way to do the latter.

_Naturalism Without Mirrors_ nevertheless plants an important flag in the logical space of metaphilosophy and maps its borders with Blackburn’s quasi-realism, Brandom’s inferentialism, Carnap’s positivism, Rorty’s pragmatism, and Wittgenstein’s pluralism with a combination of careful exposition, original insight, and stylish readability that you wouldn’t expect in this terrain—unless, of course, you’ve already had the pleasure of traveling it with a guide like Price.

_Alexis Burgess_
_Sanford University_

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Paul K. Moser, _The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined_.

In this important work, Paul Moser argues from the experience of moral transformation to the existence of a God worthy of worship. He does so after rejecting fideism and reformed epistemology and after criticizing any natural theology based on premises that are public or scientific knowledge. In the introduction, he puts this argument in the context of his parable of Hell’s Canyon: hikers lost in inaccessible terrain debating about what, if any, help they might get. Moser’s point is that the existence of God is not a purely intellectual topic.

Although Moser’s argument is full of interesting detail, its outline is straightforward. The book is a case for the existence of a “God worth believing in,” as people say, or more precisely, a God worthy of worship, which is what Moser means by ‘God’. (I shall use the phrase ‘the god’ to denote a creator without the implication of moral perfection.) Moser begins by rejecting both fideism and reformed epistemology, relying on the subjective-arbitrary dilemma (129). He uses his critique of fideism, and of Kierkegaard in particular, to endorse the truism that faith is far more than belief but requires trust and obedience. The seriousness of faith rules out any subjective or arbitrary faith, and shows that both horns of the dilemma are sharp. I would contrast faith here with belief in the merits of the football team you support, where neither subjectivity nor arbitrariness would be serious epistemic defects.

Next, Moser criticizes natural theology, understood as the project of arguing from public or scientific knowledge to the existence of God. Because
he rightly takes the word 'God' to refer to a worship-worthy being, not merely to a creator; his chief criticism is that natural theology does not establish or even confirm that God exists, whatever else it establishes or confirms" (153). A related criticism is that if natural theology were to succeed, that would itself be contrary to our expectations of a God who plays hide and seek (154). (Compare the theological significance of the Babel fish in Douglas Adams's The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy.) Given his lack of enthusiasm for the project, it is no surprise that Moser gives a lukewarm assessment of the success of natural theology considered as a case for a god of some sort. It is more surprising that he does not consider Newman's argument from conscience.

Finally, Moser supplies his case for the existence of God, understood in the above sense. His considered formulation requires the definition of a transformative gift: "One's being authoritatively convicted in conscience and forgiven by X of sin and thereby being authoritatively called into volitional fellowship with X in perfect love and into rightful worship toward X... and on that basis transformed by X from default tendencies to selfishness and despair to... a default position of unselfish love." (200, my italics).

The second premise of the argument is that "I have been offered... this transformative gift." The first premise is: "Necessarily, if a human person is offered and receives the transformative gift, then this is the result of the authoritative power of a divine X of thoroughgoing forgiveness, fellowship in perfect love, worthiness of worship, and triumphant hope (namely God)." The words emphasized by my italics indicate that the second premise is strictly speaking redundant because it is true by definition that if a human person is offered the transformative gift, then God exists. If, however, we deleted the words 'authoritative' and 'rightful', then the second premise would seem to be false because the conditional "if a human person..." within the scope of 'necessarily' is not necessary. For then it would be possible that there is a god of great power who for utilitarian reasons transforms some of us but is not in fact worthy of worship, precisely because utilitarianism is not loving but merely benevolent. My first amendment, therefore, to Moser's argument is to delete the word 'necessarily' in the first premise. My second amendment is to make it explicit that, in the definition of a transformative gift, X is an intentional object of the experience of the one who receives the gift. In that case, receiving the transformative gift is evidence for, but does not entail, the existence of the giver, X. Moser holds that this evidence is conclusive unless accompanied by some defeater (206), so I take it that this second amendment is merely a clarification. Others might insist that even if there is no defeater, the evidence is inconclusive. Perhaps, though, this does not matter, for there is a defeater of certainty, namely, the plausibility that some people sincerely exaggerate their own love of others. As Aquinas says in a somewhat different context (On Truth, question 10, article 10), you can only know with certainty that you have charity if God reveals it to you that you do.
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Such a revelation would be something in addition to the transformative gift. Thus amended, the argument succeeds *in the absence of defeaters*.

I am, however, critical of Moser’s treatment of fideism and of natural theology. Fideists (and reformed epistemologists) might, for instance, have experienced the transformative gift but be troubled by the apparent plausibility of naturalism. Now consider the following disjunction: either naturalism is correct or God exists. Fideists might reason to that disjunction but then believe without reasons the second disjunct. They, unlike naturalists, may then appeal to divine power as the source of their belief, avoiding the charge of arbitrariness. For what it is worth, I judge fideism to be rare among believers living in contemporary secular societies, where the phrase ‘I just believe’ or, annoyingly, ‘I just know’ are used as conversation-stoppers on all sorts of issues. I suspect most self-proclaimed fideists, like most nonreflective naturalists, rely on an intuitive sense of what is the worldview of greatest explanatory power. This may be compared to Charles Sanders Peirce’s “argument from meseum” (in his article, published in 1908, “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”), in which he advocates experimentally thinking about things from a theistic point of view and experiencing the understanding that results. Natural theology further explicates the various truths understood in terms of theism.

My chief disagreement with Moser concerns his rejection of natural theology, for instance the agency-based program of Richard Swinburne. First, the dismissal of it as not conducive to God’s purposes is based upon quite detailed hypotheses about the divine intentions. For example, Moser says that “God would aim to interact with humans via *calling* them into the needed fellowship and transformation” (145, Moser’s italics). Maybe, but maybe God calls some in this way and interacts with others in different ways. We should be cautious about extrapolating from the experience of some to a hypothesis about how God intends to relate to all. For all I know—and for all Moser knows—God may be angry at the widespread unwillingness of Christians to engage in natural theology.

Nor is natural theology essentially technical or abstruse. As I have asserted above, it explicates the ways in which the God-centered understanding of things is superior to naturalism and to other rivals. How technical the debate gets depends on the level of detail of the explication. This superiority claim is itself based on the acceptance of agency as a fact about the world not to be explained in naturalistic terms. Such a belief in primitive agency is contestable but is, I think, a presupposition of Moser’s emphasis on our freedom to accept or reject the transformative gift.

Moser also complains that natural theology leads not to the existence of God but merely to the existence of a god of some sort. This is an important criticism, but it may be met by the following constructive dilemma. I begin with a comment on the failure of the ontological argument: there is no concept of the divine whose nature, as a concept, guarantees its instantiation. Nonetheless,
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some concepts are a priori more likely than others to be instantiated, and the
concept of an uncreated being that is unlimited in various respects is more likely
than one that is limited in one of those respects. So if the god, whom I do not yet
call ‘God’, creates because of a morally good character, then we should suppose
no moral limitation whatever, and so take the god to indeed be God. On the
other hand, if the god lacks either a good or bad moral character and creates in a
purely utilitarian fashion out of recognition of what is worth creating, then the
same “cold” reasoning should lead the god to become a loving, worship-worthy
god, and so to become God. (To those who say it is not possible for God to
to change, I note that necessities should not be multiplied.)

In spite of some disagreements, I admire this book: not only does Moser
provide an important audience-specific argument for the existence of God, but
he achieves his purpose of reminding philosophers of religion of the topics
central to Christianity, namely, faith, hope, and love.

Peter Forrest
University of New England, Australia

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Michael Strevens’s *Depth* is an impressive contribution to several central issues
in the philosophy of science. Primarily, the book is concerned with developing
Strevens’s at base causal account of explanation, which he dubs the kaietic
account of explanation. However, in the process of developing the kaietic
account of explanation, Strevens also makes substantial contributions to related
areas such as the debate about the nature of causal claims, the nature of
higher-level laws, and the notion(s) of probability. *Depth* is an incredibly rich
book, and in what follows, I will merely try to summarize some of the central
aspects of the account of explanation that it offers while only being able to
mention some of the other particularly interesting contributions that Strevens
makes in this book.

\[\text{There are aspects of Strevens's account that are not causal, namely, what he calls}
\text{"basing generalizations" (see section 7.3). However, these are still only explanatory as part}
\text{of an otherwise causal explanation.}\]

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